-
March 11, 2026
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.Hornor v. Upper Freehold Regional Board of Education, A-36-24
Russell Forde Hornor v. Upper Freehold Regional Board of Education
(A-36-24) (089973)
Ormond Simpkins, Jr. v. South Orange-Maplewood School District
(A-37/38/39-24) (089974)
Argued September 26, 2025 -- Decided March 11, 2026
JUSTICE PATTERSON, writing for the Court.
In these appeals from four matters in which the plaintiffs allege that New Jersey public school teachers sexually abused them when they were high school students, the Court considers whether N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1), a provision of the Child Victims Act enacted by the Legislature in 2019, authorizes the imposition of vicarious liability on a school district for a teacher’s sexual abuse of a student outside the scope of the teacher’s employment. One appeal raises a second issue: whether the Appellate Division properly reversed the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
Plaintiff Russell Forde Hornor filed an action asserting in part that the Upper Freehold Regional Board of Education was vicariously liable for science teacher Charles Hutler’s alleged sexual abuse of plaintiff at Hutler’s home in 1979, when plaintiff was fifteen years old, and that the Board breached a fiduciary duty to him. The trial court denied the Board’s motion to dismiss those claims. The Appellate Division reversed on appeal. The Court granted Hornor’s motion for leave to appeal. 260 N.J. 82 (2025).
Plaintiffs’ claims in the three cases brought against the South Orange-Maplewood School District -- consolidated as Simpkins -- arise from sexual abuse allegedly committed by English and special education teacher Nicole Dufault. The three plaintiffs allege that Dufault sexually assaulted them during and after school hours, including on school grounds. The trial court granted the District’s motions to dismiss in all three cases. The Appellate Division consolidated the cases and affirmed. As in Hornor, the appellate court in Simpkins held that N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) does not allow vicarious liability for the alleged conduct. The Court granted the motions for leave to appeal filed by each of the three plaintiffs. 260 N.J. 87 (2025); 260 N.J. 89 (2025); 260 N.J. 93 (2025). The Court consolidated the three appeals in Simpkins with the appeal in Hornor for purposes of its opinion.
HELD: N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) does not categorically bar the imposition of vicarious liability on a public entity for acts of sexual abuse outside the scope of a teacher’s employment, and plaintiffs’ vicarious liability claims should not have been dismissed at the pleading stage. The Court adopts a standard for the determination of vicarious liability claims asserted against public schools pursuant to the statute. As to the second issue, a public school does not bear a fiduciary duty to a student.
1. In Hardwicke v. American Boychoir School, the Court considered, in part, vicarious liability claims asserted against a private boarding school by a former student who alleged repeated sexual assault by the school’s music director. 188 N.J. 69, 76, 79 (2006). The Court rejected the school’s argument that it could not be held vicariously liable for the intentional acts of its employees. Id. at 100. The Court did not, however, prescribe a specific standard for claims premised on a nonprofit boarding school’s vicarious liability for common-law claims arising from sexual abuse outside the scope of employment. See id. at 100-02. Instead, the Court reiterated the vicarious liability standard it had imposed in the employment settings of Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 132 N.J. 587, 619-20 (1993) and Abbamont v. Piscataway Township Board of Education, 138 N.J. 405, 429-32 (1994). (pp. 22-28)
2. When it enacted the Tort Claims Act (TCA) in 1972, the Legislature determined that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by [the TCA], a public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(a). In N.J.S.A. 59:2-2(a), the Legislature prescribed an exception to its broad grant of immunity for vicarious liability for “an act or omission of a public employee within the scope of his employment.” But the Legislature expressly immunized public entities from vicarious liability “for the acts or omissions of a public employee constituting a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.” N.J.S.A. 59:2-10. Accordingly, prior to the enactment of the Child Victims Act in 2019, the TCA barred virtually all claims for public entity vicarious liability arising from public employees’ sexual assaults of children. The Child Victims Act fundamentally altered the law governing civil claims against public entities and certain private entities arising from sexual abuse. In the provision at the center of these appeals, now codified at N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a), the Legislature abrogated TCA immunities that would otherwise bar claims against certain public entities in “an action at law for damages as a result of a sexual assault . . . or sexual abuse . . . being committed against a person which was caused by a willful, wanton, or grossly negligent act of the public entity or public employee.” (pp. 29-35)
3. In the wake of the Child Victims Act, neither the TCA’s broad general rule of immunity in N.J.S.A. 59:2-1(a), nor any TCA provisions that confer immunity in specific settings -- including, as relevant here, N.J.S.A. 59:2-10 -- apply to claims premised on sexual assault and other sexual misconduct as described in N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a). That conclusion is underscored by N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)’s legislative history. By virtue of N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1), the Legislature has eliminated the immunities to which the public entities in these appeals would otherwise be entitled, and vicarious liability claims against a public entity for a public employee’s sexual misconduct under N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) are not categorically barred solely on the basis that the sexual misconduct alleged is beyond the scope of employment. The TCA does not immunize the defendant school districts in these appeals. (pp. 36-39)
4. The Court considers the standard a plaintiff must satisfy to establish the vicarious liability of a public school under N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a) for a claim based on a teacher’s sexual assault of, or sexual misconduct against, a student. The Legislature cited Hardwicke in statements about the Child Victims Act, suggesting that it envisioned a fact-specific analysis of school officials’ acts and omissions as they relate to a school employee’s sexual abuse of a student. Moreover, the Lehmann and Abbamont decisions on which Hardwicke relied stress the importance of incentivizing employers to implement and enforce meaningful policies against sexual harassment in the workplace. Accordingly, any standard imposed for claims asserted under N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) should incentivize school officials to vigilantly guard against the sexual abuse of students through the implementation and enforcement of appropriate policies. The presence or absence of such policies should be a factor in the analysis. But the Lehmann standard cited in Hardwicke was designed for sexual harassment claims brought by employees in the workplace, not claims based on the sexual abuse of students in a public school, and so not all elements of that standard are relevant in the school context. (pp. 39-46)
5. The Court holds that in order for a plaintiff to prevail in a vicarious liability claim in an action at law for damages under N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) against a public school arising from a school employee’s sexual abuse of or sexual misconduct against a student caused by a willful, wanton, or grossly negligent act of the school employee, the factfinder must determine that:
(1) The school gave the employee who allegedly committed sexual abuse or other sexual misconduct described in N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a)(1) the authority to control the student’s educational environment;
(2) the school employee’s exercise of that authority resulted in the sexual abuse or sexual misconduct; and
(3) it reasonably appeared that the school employee’s sexual abuse of or sexual misconduct against the student was tacitly approved by the school.Application of the standard involves a case-specific inquiry, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. The Court provides guidance for applying the standard it adopts, including a non-exhaustive list of relevant considerations. (pp. 46-48)Oral argument can be found HERE.
6. The Court responds to the dissent. (pp. 48-54)
7. A fiduciary relationship arises when one person is under a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of another on matters within the scope of their relationship. A fiduciary’s obligations to the dependent party include a duty of loyalty and a duty to exercise reasonable skill and care. The Court agrees with the Appellate Division’s determination that a public school district “owes obligations to multiple stakeholders involved in educating the district’s children, often with conflicting interests,” and that the imposition of a fiduciary duty to a specific student would be incompatible with “the duty’s defining characteristic of undivided loyalty to a particular person or interest.” The Court therefore affirms the Appellate Division’s judgment that Hornor’s breach of fiduciary duty claim should be dismissed. (pp. 55-57)
8. In light of Hornor’s allegations that Hutler sexually assaulted him at Hutler’s residence outside of school hours, the Court remands the Hornor matter to the trial court for determination of the Board’s motion to dismiss Hornor’s vicarious liability claim pursuant to the standard set forth in the Court’s opinion. All three plaintiffs in Simpkins have adequately pled vicarious liability claims under that standard, and the Court remands the three matters to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. The judgment of the Appellate Division in Hornor is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The judgment of the Appellate Division in the three matters in Simpkins is reversed. (pp. 57-58)
AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART.
JUSTICE FASCIALE, dissenting, explains that neither N.J.S.A. 59:2-1.3(a) nor its legislative history support extending vicarious liability to acts committed outside the scope of employment or the adoption of a “tacit approval” standard as a guardrail on such liability. Justice Fasciale would instead hold that public school districts may only be vicariously liable for their employees’ tortious sexual acts committed within the scope of their employment, and that such acts fall within the scope of employment in a specific context if: (1) the employee possessed an official, entity-granted in loco parentis relationship to the victim, by which they were given authority and control over the victim; and (2) the employee engaged in the tortious acts during the exercise of that authority in performing entity-assigned duties, or otherwise engaging in a course of conduct subject to the entity’s control. Justice Fasciale finds that the vicarious liability claims in Hornor do not meet that standard and should be dismissed but that those in Simpkins do and should be allowed to proceed, though for substantially different reasons than the majority.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, NORIEGA, and HOFFMAN join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion. JUSTICE FASCIALE filed a dissent.
