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January 30, 2009

Obama Signs Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act into Law

Barack Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act yesterday. I've written about this legislation before, and won't repeat it today, except to say that this is a sign that the current Congress is willing to take action to protect employees' rights, and a sign that Congress is willing to overrule the Supreme Court when it will not fully implement Congressional intent.

Here is an excerpt from President Obama's remarks:

"Equal pay is by no means just a women's issue -- it's a family issue. It's about parents who find themselves with less money for tuition and child care; couples who wind up with less to retire on; households where one breadwinner is paid less than she deserves; that's the difference between affording the mortgage -- or not; between keeping the heat on, or paying the doctor bills -- or not. And in this economy, when so many folks are already working harder for less and struggling to get by, the last thing they can afford is losing part of each month's paycheck to simple and plain discrimination.

"So signing this bill today is to send a clear message: that making our economy work means making sure it works for everybody; that there are no second-class citizens in our workplaces; and that it's not just unfair and illegal, it's bad for business to pay somebody less because of their gender or their age or their race or their ethnicity, religion or disability; and that justice isn't about some abstract legal theory, or footnote in a casebook. It's about how our laws affect the daily lives and the daily realities of people: their ability to make a living and care for their families and achieve their goals.

"Ultimately, equal pay isn't just an economic issue for millions of Americans and their families, it's a question of who we are -- and whether we're truly living up to our fundamental ideals; whether we'll do our part, as generations before us, to ensure those words put on paper some 200 years ago really mean something -- to breathe new life into them with a more enlightened understanding that is appropriate for our time."

-- Pres. Barack H. Obama, in remarks at signing ceremony for the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Jan. 29, 2009

January 26, 2009

The Supreme Court Recognizes a Broad Interpretation of the Anti-retaliation Provision of Title VII

By Tiffanie Benfer

Just this morning, the Court issued a decision that sets forth a broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, and concluded it applies to employees participating in an internal investigation of Title VII violations. The decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville will make it easier for employees to bring retaliation claims. It serves as a caution to employers, who should be aware that they may be liable for retaliation even if a court finds that there is no merit to the underlying discrimination claim.

Justice Souter delivered the opinion, in which Roberts, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Alito wrote a concurring opinion that Thomas joined.

Plaintiff, Ms. Crawford, cooperated in her employer’s internal investigation of a sexual harassment complaint. Consequently, she was terminated for alleged embezzlement and drug use, allegations which were later found to be untrue. Ms Crawford brought suit against her employer for retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. Her employer asserted that her actions did not constitute “protected activity” because she reported the sexual harassment during an internal investigation.

The Court concluded: “There is … no reason to doubt that a person can “oppose” by responding to someone else’s question just as surely as by provoking the discussion, and nothing in the statute requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same discrimination in the same words when her boss ask a question.”

The Court recognized the obvious dilemma the appeals court’s ruling would create for any knowledgeable employee in hostile work environment.

The appeal court’s decision created a catch-22. If an employee kept quiet about discrimination in an internal investigation and later filed a Title VII claim, the employer would have a good chance of evade liability by asserting that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct [any discrimination] promptly, but the plaintiff employee reasonably failed to take advantage of … preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.” The Court concluded that there was nothing in the text of the statute or precedent that supported creating such loop hole for the employer to escape liability and thus a broad interpretation is necessary.

January 23, 2009

Senate Passes Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act!

Late yesterday afternoon, the U.S. Senate passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act by a vote of 61 to 36. I’ve written about this legislation several times. This bill reverses the Supreme Court decision in Goodyear v. Ledbetter, which strictly limited the timeframe for employees to file a claim for pay discrimination. Under the Supreme Court decision those claims would be barred by the narrow statute of limitations in Title VII.

It looks as if this will be the first bill signed into by President Obama.

Here’s a link to a news story about the vote.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=awK1FNtOsAVI&refer=us

January 22, 2009

Unanimous Supreme Court Allows Suit Against School for Its Failure to Properly Respond to Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment


Yesterday the Supreme Court unanimously held that students who are sexually harassed in school may bring a claim under Title IX and under Section 1983 of the civil rights laws. Thus, the Supreme Court resolved a split in the circuits (the intermediate appellate courts) in favor of allowing civil rights suits to go forward. This pro-plaintiff decision was a surprise from the current Supreme Court.

In Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 2009 WL 128173 (U.S. 2009), the parents of a kindergarten student reported to the school that their daughter was bullied and sexually harassed by a third grader on the school bus. They told the school that the older child made their daughter pull up her dress, pull down her underpants and spread her legs. The parents were not satisfied when the school suggested transferring their daughter to a different bus, feeling that the proposed solution would punish the wrong child.

The parents sued the school district, claiming that its response was inadequate, bringing claims under Title IX (the federal law which prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender in schools which receive federal funds) and Section 1983 (a federal civil rights law which confers a private right of action for Constitutional violations). The lower courts threw out the claim on summary judgment, finding 1) the school district’s response was reasonable under Title IX; and 2) that the parents could not sue for gender discrimination under Section 1983, because that civil rights law was preempted by Title IX.

The Supreme Court held that Title IX did not preempt Section 1983 because of the limits in Title IX’s enforcement mechanisms. The Court then held that the parents would be permitted to make the argument on remand that the school engaged in discriminatory treatment in the investigation of student behavior.

This opinion is significant because it makes clear that students who claim discrimination on the basis of gender have a private right to sue for damages under Section 1983. On a broader scale, this case seems to indicate that the Supreme Court may be backing off the very narrow interpretations of civil rights laws which have marked some decisions in recent years. My theory is that the Supreme Court -- made up of nine human beings -- may be just a bit influenced by the more progressive direction of national opinion these days. This case is good news for plaintiffs with civil rights cases.

January 19, 2009

Martin Luther King Said It Better Than I Can

As someone who works daily on cases involving racial discrimination and other prejudices, I can’t let Martin Luther King Day pass without comment. But, anything I can say is inadequate, both to the memory of Martin Luther King and to the anticipation of our first African American President. Rather than waste time with my own words, I’ve given you a few of my favorite MLK “law, justice and employment” quotes.

“A right delayed is a right denied.”

“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

“It may be true that the law cannot make a man love me, but it can keep him from lynching me, and I think that's pretty important.”

“All labor that uplifts humanity has dignity and importance and should be undertaken with painstaking excellence.”
“History will have to record that the greatest tragedy of this period of social transition was not the strident clamor of the bad people, but the appalling silence of the good people.”

“Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable... Every step toward the goal of justice requires sacrifice, suffering, and struggle; the tireless exertions and passionate concern of dedicated individuals.”

“Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress.”

“Philanthropy is commendable, but it must not cause the philanthropist to overlook the circumstances of economic injustice which make philanthropy necessary.”

“Rarely do we find men who willingly engage in hard, solid thinking. There is an almost universal quest for easy answers and half-baked solutions. Nothing pains some people more than having to think.”

“We may have all come on different ships, but we're in the same boat now.”

“We will remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends.”

“Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you ought to be. This is the interrelated structure of reality.”

January 15, 2009

We're Still Not There on Gay Rights

If you have time to escape to the movies this weekend, I recommend: “Milk.” Sean Penn was terrific. Do we think that Harvey Milk would be pleased with the progress we’ve made on civil rights protection for gays? Probably not.

Thirty years after Harvey Milk’s assassination, bigotry and discrimination against gays and lesbians remains socially acceptable in too many circles and legal in too many states.

Despite my general optimism about protection of civil rights in the new Obama administration, the failure of Proposition 8 in California shows that we still have a long way to go before civil rights for the GLBT community are recognized. Obama hasn’t sent signals that he will go out on a limb on this issue. During the campaign he was noncommittal at best on the question of gay marriage. Obama’s choice of Rick Warren to do the invocation at the inauguration may be seen as reaching out to cultural conservatives at the expense of gays and lesbians. (I’m not sure whether his more recent announcement that openly the openly gay Episcopalian bishop, Gene Robinson, would also be presenting a prayer during ceremonies will help.)

I think that our children’s generation will look back the arguments against gay rights with the same sense of outrage as we feel when we see footage of those who opposed integration in the 60’s.

In the meantime, from an employment law perspective, we have a long way to go. Many people are surprised to learn that federal civil rights laws do not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. There are ways around this, and there are numerous cases where harassment of a gay employee has been held to violate the proscription against gender discrimination, because the harassment was grounded in the employee’s failure to meet gender stereotypes.

As usual, New Jersey’s state law is more progressive on this issue than Pennsylvania’s. Gays and lesbians are protected by New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination, but Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act does not provide any protection. I discussed possible theories of recovery in Pennsylvania in more detail in an article published a couple years ago in the Hill Wallack Quarterly, “Protection Against Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Pennsylvania’s Scattered Approach.” Here’s the link:

http://www.hillwallack.com/web-content/news/article_v18n1_10.html

It seems to me that the issue of equal rights for employment and housing is a touch less charged for middle America than the issue of gay marriage. Although I feel that both are important civil rights issues, it may be more effective in the end to address one issue at a time. Here is hoping that Congress will hear from the majority of Americans who want equal employment opportunities for everyone.

January 14, 2009

Nooses

Last week, in a post entitled "$1.55 million Settlement . . . ", I discussed cases handled by this office which involve egregious symbols of racial hatred, including hanging nooses. Some of those cases cannot be discussed here because of confidentiality agreements.

Last night, Channel 10 ran a story about one of the cases handled by Hill Wallack's employment group. This case involves an employee who complained of racial harassment (including the display of a hangman's noose). This employee has now found that his union is retaliating against him. For a transcript and commentary on Joanne Rathgeber's TV appearance, click the link:

http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/Man-Allegedly-Confronted-by-Co-Worker-with-Noose.html

January 12, 2009

The Supreme Court Considers Again the Scope of Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision

By Tiffanie Benfer, Esq.

January is National Stalking Awareness Month. I think it is quite poetic that on January 9, 2009, the Supreme Court considered Ms. Dawn Martin’s Petition for rehearing, which asks the Court to reconsider whether her termination for reporting a stalker in the workplace falls within the scope of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII. Ms. Martin was stalked in her workplace, and then was subsequently fired for asking her employer to implement existing security procedures to keep the stalker out of the workplace. If the lower court’s decision is not reversed, women like Ms. Martin will be forced to choose between their safety and their job. The Court previously denied Ms. Martin’s Petition for Certiorari in 2008.

Ms. Martin asks that the Court reconsider her work place stalking case in light of the Court’s consideration of Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_06_1595/ Oral argument in the Crawford matter took place on October 8, 2008, the Court considered: “Does the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act apply to employees fired for participating in an internal investigation of sexual harassment?”

Ms. Martin asks that the Court reconsider her work place stalking case in light of the Court’s consideration of Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_06_1595/ Oral argument in the Crawford matter took place on October 8, 2008, the Court considered: “Does the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act apply to employees fired for participating in an internal investigation of sexual harassment?”

Both Ms. Martin and Ms. Crawford experienced harassment at the workplace, and then were terminated shortly after reporting the harassment to their employers. Both women challenge the lower courts’ interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision in Title VII and assert that a broader interpretation is necessary and was intended by the legislature. In both cases, the women were barred from presenting the argument that they were fired because they reported the harassment. The lower courts held that the women did not engage in “protected activity” because of the way in which they reported the sexual harassment to their respective employers.

Specifically, Ms. Martin was stalked at work by a man seeking the physical embodiment of his “fantasy,” or ideal “wife”. Ms. Martin requested that her employer Howard University provide her with protection. Instead of implementing the University’s Campus Security procedures already in place, the University refused to renew her teaching contract. Ms. Martin brought suit against her employer for sexual harassment/hostile work environment and retaliation for reporting sexual harassment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex/gender and other protected class. With regards to retaliation claims Ms. Crawford specifically ask the Court to consider:

Where a woman is sexually harassed in her workplace by a non-employee, what “magic words” must she use in order to be protected from retaliation, as guided by EEOC Regulation 29 CFR § 1604.11(e)?
Where an employer cancels an advertised job vacancy, and leaves additional vacancies unfilled to avoid consideration of an applicant/employee who has complained of sexual harassment, does this conduct constitute actionable retaliation under Title VII, as defined by Burlington Northern v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)?

Her petition also asks the Court to consider:
Since 80% of stalking victims are women, should a disparate impact theory of discrimination be applied to find that workplace/campus stalking constitutes sexual harassment, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
Must a plaintiff prove that she was “groped” or “touched” to prevail on a claim of sexual harassment?
Is harassment “based on sex” when the harasser uses gender-specific language, referring to the victim as his “wife?”

Where a stalker selects his female victim because she fits the “profile” of a fictitious female character, is the harassment “gender profiling,” using a “sex-plus” analysis?
Ms. Martin is the first to present the issue of “gender profiling” or “working while female” in the employment context. This issue has been skirted by the lower courts, but may at last been given a more definitive answer should the Supreme Court decide to hear her petition.

As for Ms. Crawford, she cooperated in her employer’s internal investigation of sexual harassment. Consequently, she was terminated for alleged embezzlement and drug use, allegations which were found to be untrue. Ms Crawford brought suit against her employer for retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. Her employer asserted that her actions did not constitute “protected activity” because she reported the sexual harassment during an internal investigation. As previously stated, Ms. Crawford ask the Court to consider: “ Does the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act apply to employees fired for participating in an internal investigation of sexual harassment?”

Both women have asked the Court to consider the scope of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII. In 2006, the Court recognized the practical importance of a broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. White. The Court articulated a broad standard for determining the type of conduct that may constitute retaliation under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The question is whether the Court will also provide a broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.

Until the case is decided, employers are well advised not to retaliate against an employee for reporting discrimination/harassment of a protected class, even if there has not yet been an EEOC investigation.

January 09, 2009

Late Breaking News -- Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and Paycheck Fairness Act Move Forward

TWO, FOUR, SIX, EIGHT, WOMEN SAY THE HOUSE IS REALLY GREAT!

The House of Representatives, that is… Two hours ago, the House of Representatives passed two bills that will help prevent gender based pay discrimination. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act reverses the decision of the Supreme Court, which I wrote about in my first ever entry on this blog. The decision had interpreted the statute of limitations for Title VII so narrowly that it made it impossible in practical terms for those who suffered pay discrimination to seek recourse.

The Paycheck Fairness Act stiffens penalties for gender based pay discrimination. It also addresses a related problem, protecting workers who share pay information with their colleagues from retribution by the employer. This protection is necessary because employers who forbid employees from sharing pay information are effectively preventing the employees from learning about pay discrimination.

These were just the second and third pieces of legislation voted on by the House since it resumed sessions on Tuesday. Last year, the Senate struck down the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. It should pass handily in the newly elected Senate.

This looks like a signal for sea change in direction after the conservative Bush years. The conservative majority of the Supreme Court may continue to try to narrowly interpret civil rights legislation, but Congress has sent a strong message – through the ADA Amendments Act (which I previously wrote about) and these new laws – that it will take swift action to undo the damage done by the Court. It will be interesting to see if Congressional action to overturn Supreme Court decisions tempers the "conservative activism" of this Supreme Court the next time it is called on to interpret civil rights legislation.

Here's a link about the vote: http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/09/news/economy/pay_equity/

January 08, 2009

$1.55 Million Settlement in Case of Religious Discrimination and National Origin Discrimination

Last week, Merrill Lynch agreed to pay $1.55 million to settle a case of discrimination brought by an Iranian Muslim employee who alleged that he was passed over for promotion and then fired because of his religion and national origin. The complaint alleged that the employee was told that he would not be allowed on the trading floor “because you are from a country which has a high risk factor and a threat.” Not surprisingly, Merrill Lynch denied the accusations.

What accounts for this relatively large settlement? From the publicly available information, it appears that managers at Merrill Lynch were blatant in expressing their bigotry. Bigotry that is expressed in more subtle ways is equally illegal, but may be more difficult to prove. Another important factor is that the Plaintiff in this case was a highly compensated professional. When a highly paid employee is fired, the potential for damages grows.

For accounts of this settlement, see:

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/12-31-08a.html

http://www.forbes.com/reuters/feeds/reuters/2008/12/31/2008-12-31T211636Z_01_N31349562_RTRIDST_0_MERRILL-EEOC-SETTLEMENT-UPDATE-2.html

Generally, the public does not hear about the size of settlements in employment cases. Unless the case goes to trial (which is rare, given the expense of legal fees), virtually all settlements are entered with a confidentiality agreement. Occasionally, the EEOC decides to join a plaintiff in a case which the EEOC feels has particular merit. Because the EEOC does not allow a confidential settlement, the public is more likely to learn of those cases.
Joanne Rathgeber of Hill Wallack’s employment group worked with the EEOC to obtain a $ 1.65 million settlement in a race discrimination suit last year.

For information on that settlement, see the link:

http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5-5-08.html

That case involved an employer (Conectiv) and subcontractors who failed to protect African American employees from racial harassment, including hanging nooses and truly disgusting graffiti in the restrooms. It is disturbing to be in this field and see how often blatant bias is tolerated in the workplace. Hill Wallack's employment group has handled and successfully settled several of these cases … which can’t be discussed here because of confidentiality agreements!


January 02, 2009

Pennsylvania Lets the Sun Shine In

“Sunshine is the best disinfectant” -- Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis

Finally! Pennsylvania’s amended Right to Know Law went into effect yesterday. For years, Pennsylvania has been among the worst states in the nation when it comes to openness of public records. Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Law had so many loopholes, restrictions and impediments to enforcement that it was dubbed the “Right Not to Know Law."

Under the new Right to Know Law, most public records maintained by state agencies are presumed to be available to the public. In the past, only a narrow set of records, such as accounts, contracts or minutes, were presumed open. Under the new law, the public official who resists disclosure has the burden to show that the information should not be disclosed. In the past, the burden was on the citizen who sought information, often requiring those who wished to learn about what their government was doing to incur attorneys’ fees.

This is an important step forward to good government.

New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act (OPRA) has allowed fairly expansive disclosure of public records for years. It is good to see Pennsylvania starting to catch up. On my wish-list for 2009 – maybe Pennsylvania will emulate New Jersey’s excellent whistleblower statute (the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, or CEPA), so that private sector employees who report wrongdoing will have protection from retaliation.

For a copy of Pennsylvania’s new Right to Know Law and more information about it, take a look here.

http://openrecords.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt?

January 01, 2009

The Americans with Disabilities Act is Tougher than Ever: What’s an Employer to Do?

Happy New Year! Congress gave American workers a huge gift this year by amending the Americans with Disabilities Act. Those amendments, which sustantially increase the protections for disabled workers, go into effect today.

Since 1992, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has prohibited discrimination against the disabled. The Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act (ADA-AA), which goes into effect today -- January 1, 2009 -- represents the most significant change to employment law in years. The ADA-AA greatly expands the class of persons who may seek protection as “disabled” and therefore expands responsibilities – and potential liability – for employers.
Passage of the ADA-AA was a decisive victory for advocates of employees and the disabled. After a series of court decisions during the last 15 years had steadily narrowed the reach of the ADA, Congress stepped in with the ADA-AA and told the courts in no uncertain terms that the ADA is to be interpreted far more broadly.

Why did Congress take this action?

The ADA protects disabled employees from discrimination if those employees are able to do their job “with a reasonable accommodation.” Therefore, an employee with a disability so severe that he or she cannot perform the job is not protected. To be protected by the ADA, an employee must be disabled but not too disabled.

Over recent years a series of court cases narrowed the class of people who could be considered disabled. In other words, employees who were not sufficiently disabled were found by the courts not to qualify for the ADA’s protection.

These interpretations of the ADA set up a paradox for employers, employees and courts. Advocates for the disabled and for employees complained that many employees fell through the cracks: if they were disabled enough to qualify for protection under the court decisions, they might be too disabled to show that they could still do the job.

What does the ADA-AA do?

The ADA-AA specifically overrules four Supreme Court decisions, which employers have used to argue for a narrow interpretation of the scope of the ADA.

Lower standard in the definition of disability: The Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, instructed lower courts to apply a “demanding standard” when determining which employees were disabled. Congress specifically rejected this narrow “demanding standard,” effectively overruling the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADA. The new ADA-AA states that there must be “a broad scope of protection” for employees, and specifically directs courts interpreting the ADA to protect plaintiffs “to the maximum extent permitted by the statute.”

This language will be extremely helpful to employees who are bringing discrimination suits under the ADA. Cases which might have been thrown out on summary judgment under the standard required by the Supreme Court are now likely to proceed to a jury trial, and the instructions given to the jury about what conditions might be considered a disability will be much broader.

Mitigating Measures: The ADA-AA also specifically provides that a court may not consider mitigating measures in determining whether a person’s condition is a “disability.” This change overrules the Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, which had provided that a person was disabled only if he or she was impaired in a major life activity even after accounting for mitigating measures.

This change will provide ADA protection for a significant for number of employees whose cases would have been dismissed under previous rulings. For example, in the past, an employee whose epilepsy is controlled by medication might have been considered not disabled. Now, the ADA instructs the court to consider whether the condition without the benefit of medication would be a disability. In the past, an employee with a prosthetic or a hearing aid might also be considered not disabled if those devices allowed the employee to engage in all major life activities. Now, a court must consider the plaintiff’s condition without those adaptive devices.

Moreover, this change eliminates a common employer defense, making it impossible for employers to argue that there is some mitigating measure that the employee could have used so as not to be “disabled.”
In a nod to common sense, eyeglasses and contact lenses are exempted from the direction not to consider mitigating measures; those of us who cannot see the alarm clock without our glasses will not qualify as “blind” under the ADA.

Major Life Activity: The ADA-AA expands the sweep of the ADA by its definition of “major life activity.” Under the ADA, a disability is defined as a condition which affects a major life activity, but the original statute did not define major life activity. The Supreme Court in Toyota Motors had narrowly interpreted the phrase, frustrating the EEOC and advocates for the disabled. The ADA-AA provides a broad definition, rejecting the narrower interpretation. Now, a wide range of activities are specifically defined as major life activities, including caring for oneself, eating, sleeping, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating and working.

Major life activities are specifically defined to include a range of bodily functions which may not be apparent to an employer, and which many courts have held did not fall within the definition of major life activities. This includes functions of the immune system, cell growth, digestive functions, reproductive functions and neurological functions. This definition will make it much easier for an employee with a disease such as diabetes, epilepsy, lupus or HIV-AIDS to show that his or her condition is a protected disability.

Episodic Impairments: The new ADA-AA also provides protection for impairments that are “episodic or in remission” if those impairments substantially affect a major life activity when they are active.

No Reverse Discrimination: The ADA-AA specifically provides that a non-disabled person cannot sue complaining that the employer has given preferential treatment to those with disabilities.

Protection against “Regarded As” Discrimination: The ADA has always protected employees from discrimination if their employer “regarded” them as disabled – whether or not they actually had a disability. In this arena also, the ADA-AA has expanded employee protection. Under the Supreme Court decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the Supreme Court held that an employee would have to make a specific showing that the employer regarded the employee as being substantially limited in a major life activity in order to show that the employer regarded the employee as disabled. Many “regarded as” cases were tossed from court because the employee could not meet this difficult burden. Under the ADA-AA, the employee must simply show that the employer regarded him or her as having a mental or physical impairment, a standard which is likely to be easier for a jury to understand and easier for an employee to prove.

What’s an Employer to Do?

Under the sweeping changes of the ADA-AA, employers are more likely to find themselves subjected to suit and employees are more likely to prevail at trial.

Probably the primary lesson of the ADA-AA for employers is “don’t assume.” Don’t assume an employee does not have a disability just because you can’t see it. Don’t assume that you can apply workplace rules across the board without making accommodations for those who may have a disability. If you as an employer are aware that an employee has a disease or impairment, make sure that you have a very good reason before telling the employees that you cannot bend the rules for him. For example, an employer who has a “no eating at the desk” rule should be prepared to make an exception for a diabetic. An employer may be legally required to be flexible with shift assignments to accommodate an employee’s need for medical treatment.

Under the ADA-AA the list of conditions which might be considered disabilities is endless, as is the list of accommodations which an employer might be required to provide. Although an employee’s request for an accommodation may seem an inconvenience, that inconvenience is minor in comparison to the risk that the employee will bring a successful discrimination suit under the ADA.