Life Sentence: When Should a Criminal Record Bar Employment?
When may an employer lawfully use information about an employee’s criminal history? May an employer refuse to hire any employee with a conviction in his or her past? The EEOC conducted an open meeting last week to discuss these questions. It is likely that the EEOC will issue more comprehensive guidelines addressing these issues in the future.
Policies that prevent the hiring of employees with a history of a criminal conviction raise questions because those policies have a disparate impact on African American employees, who are statistically more likely to have a criminal record. Many employers would prefer not to hire any employees with a criminal history – in fact, a recent survey showed that more than 40 % of employees said that they would not ever hire someone with a criminal record. Fear of a suit based on negligent hiring makes it reasonable for employers to be concerned about employees with criminal records. Is that discriminatory? And, if it does have a disparate impact on persons of color, is it allowed anyway? There is no absolutely clear answer in the statutes or case law, but there are hints and guidance
The Supreme Court and Congress have both weighed in on the standards to be applied to evaluate an employer’s policy or practice that is facially neutral but has a disparate impact on a protected class. One classic example of this sort of policy is a strength test – strength tests are more likely to exclude female employees and therefore have a disparate impact on the basis of gender. Many experts contend that looking to criminal convictions has a disparate impact on African Americans because a higher percentage of African Americans have a criminal record.
A policy is not invalid just because it has a disparate impact. In the classic U.S. Supreme Court case of Griggs v. Duke Power, the Supreme Court held that an employer can overcome a showing of disparate impact by demonstrating a “business necessity” for the practice. However, subsequent cases made clear that the criteria must be reasonably accurate for each applicant. A “more is better” approach is not allowed. Thus, in the example of strength tests, it is not enough to say that a stronger firefighter is always a better firefighter; there must be some showing that the cut-off is reasonably related to the job requirements.
There is no doubt that it is often a business necessity for an employer to ban employees with certain criminal records. Almost everyone would agree that a person with a history of sexual offenses against children should not be working in a school. But, what about a person with a thirty-year-old shoplifting record? Or, the person who tragically killed a passenger in his car because he drove while intoxicated? Should these people be barred from employment forever?
The questions become more difficult when the connection between the offense and the danger posed is tenuous, because of the nature of the job, the nature of the offense, or the time that has passed since the offense.
The EEOC’s Compliance Manual provides general guidelines on when a policy disqualifying a job applicant on the basis of a criminal conviction is permissible. The EEOC says that these policies are permitted only when the policy takes the following factors into account:
1. The nature and gravity of the offense or offenses;
2. The time that has passed since the conviction and/or completion of the sentence; and
3. The nature of the job held or sought.
There are only a few court decisions discussing these issues. In one case from the 8th circuit (Green v. Missouri Pacific RR), the employer refused to hire anyone with criminal offense other than a minor traffic violation. The court held that this policy did not meet the “business necessity” standard for two reasons: First, there was no consideration of how serious or how long ago the criminal conviction was. Thus, the policy would exclude a person who was convicted of a misdemeanor thirty years ago. Second, the job in question was in an office. There was no showing that the employees had any special access to valuable property or vulnerable people, which would require that the employer take extra care to keep former offenders out.
Last year, in El v. SEPTA, the Third Circuit (which covers New Jersey and Pennsylvania) addressed a policy which barred drivers of busses for severely disabled persons from having a conviction for a serious crime. In El, the employee had been convicted of second-degree murder as a juvenile 47 years ago, and had not had a problem with the law since. Although the court expressed reservations about the policy, it allowed the policy to stand, partly because of the vulnerability of the disabled persons with whom the plaintiff would be working. The court noted that its decision might have been different if the plaintiff had presented expert evidence to counter the expert testimony provided by SEPTA.
Although the law is quite unsettled in this area, an employer who wishes to consider prior convictions without running afoul of Title VII should tailor its limitations. For example, a hotel may reasonably be quite strict about the criminal convictions of employees such as chamber maids who have access to rooms, while the same strict limitations might not be a “business necessity” when it comes to employees who are doing landscaping work out of doors.