|
Recent Developments in Prison Litigation Cases
The unusually high number of frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners incarcerated around the country has been criticized for many years by both governmental bodies and the courts. Congress amended the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1996 ("PLRA") in an effort to stem the tide of this litigation, and the resulting waste of valuable judicial resources. The effect of this reform was intended to be far-reaching. One of the more significant portions of the Act is Section 1997e(a) which provides: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility, until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."
Congress intended Section 1997e(a) to effectively bar prisoners from suing regarding their "prison conditions" until they have exhausted their "available administrative remedies." In construing this language, courts have been faced with two separate inquiries: (1) whether the lawsuit involves prison conditions; and (2) whether the prisoner has exhausted all of the administrative remedies available to him or her.
This new language in the PLRA was not previously examined in the N.J. District Court until September 1998 when Judge Orlofsky rendered his opinion in White v. Fauver. In White, the Court held that "prison conditions" did not include claims for excessive force, and that "available remedies" meant those which could be obtained through the administrative process, whether requested or not.
In determining that excessive force was not a prison condition within the meaning of the PLRA, Judge Orlofsky analyzed the underpinnings of the new law, examining past versions of the act, other sections within the statute, and the legislative history of the new portions. After looking to these traditional sources, the Court found that "prison conditions" meant exactly that--namely, the actual living conditions inside the facility. Thus, the Court reasoned claims such as excessive force were outside the scope of the statute and not subject to the exhaustion requirement. The Court also specifically excluded from the PLRA allegations of a conspiracy to use excessive force to intimidate or to threaten further violence.
Two-Step Analysis Required
The Court then considered whether the inmates had, in fact, exhausted their available administrative remedies as required by Section 1997e(a). The Court did a two-step analysis to reach its decision: (1) whether the remedies have been exhausted, and (2) the definition of "available." In White, the Court first determined that the PLRA was only intended to require inmates to exhaust those remedies which were expressly made available to them and not those which the prisoner does not seek or which is not expressly provided by the State. For example, under the New Jersey Inmate Procedure, prisoners are limited to injunctive relief and cannot seek monetary remedies through the administrative process. Thus, the Court determined that the PLRA did not apply to those claims seeking injunctive relief or monetary damages for alleged Constitutional violations.
Since White was decided in September of 1998, however, other federal district courts around the country (including some here within the Third Circuit) have addressed and criticized the issues explained by the Court, most notably the Court's conception regarding a prisoner's "available administrative remedies." The weight of authority appears contrary to the Court's analysis in White, where inmates are seeking monetary damages, as most states' inmate administrative remedy procedures do not include provisions for the recovery of monetary damages. Under White, prisoners are still permitted to pursue their claims for monetary damages, even if they have not exhausted their administrative remedies, as money is not "available through this procedure."
Administrator Versus Judicial Remedies
However, these other courts (including the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Southern District of New York, and the Northern District of Georgia) have found that the PLRA itself does not require that the administrative and judicial remedies be identical. Moreover, these contrary decisions have held that permitting prisoner suits to go forward, without exhaustion of administrative remedies, merely because monetary damages are sought, would essentially render the new PLRA provisions useless. It is interesting to note that the new statutory language referencing "available" administrative remedies replaced "effective" administrative remedies. In essence, permitting prisoners to do an "end-run" around the exhaustion requirement by simply claiming monetary damages would defeat the stated purpose of the PLRA--i.e., to lessen the burden placed upon the federal courts because of the high number of frivolous prisoner lawsuits.
|
