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The Year in Review: Recent Legal Developments
Affecting the Real Estate Industries
by Michael J. Lipari
This edition of the Quarterly
provides summaries of the most
significant decisions issued since last
year’s Atlantic Builders Conference.
While some of the most important
cases are addressed at length throughout
this edition of the Quarterly, this
article highlights other noteworthy
rulings.
Downzonings
In an important victory for builders
and other landowners, Riya Finnegan,
LLC v. Township Council of the Township
of South Brunswick, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey revived a seldom
used doctrine known as “inverse spot
zoning” to invalidate a municipal
downzoning that was adopted to halt
a particular commercial development.
Inverse spot zoning occurs when
a zoning designation is arbitrarily
applied to a specific parcel of land and
results in less favorable treatment of
that land compared to neighboring
lands. The Township had rezoned
the land amid a public campaign
to prevent any development on the
site. The Supreme Court decision
addressed two important issues: the
standards against which courts test
the sufficiency of the reasons given by
a municipality for rezoning a parcel
of land inconsistent with the master
plan; and under what circumstances a
rezoning of a single parcel constitutes
impermissible inverse spot zoning.
The Court stressed that “the power to
zone cannot be wielded arbitrarily.”
The Court emphasized the need to
use sound planning principles before
enacting any such ordinance and
warned that “[c]omplying with the
formalities of the statute alone will
not shield a decision that lacks such
a basis.”
Off-Site Improvements
Builders and developers scored a
victory in the consolidated cases of
New Jersey Shore Builders Association
v. Township of Jackson and Builders
League of South Jersey v. Egg Harbor
Township, et al., decided by the Appellate
Division on June 23, 2008. The
court held that municipalities cannot
condition development approval
on the requirement that developers
set aside land to be used for recreation
areas or facilities, open space,
or require payments in lieu of a set
aside. The Appellate Division struck
down two municipal ordinances that
required such conditions, finding
that both were in contradiction of the
Municipal Land Use Law. The rationale
behind the court’s decision was
that the provision of public open space
and recreational facilities is something
that the public should enjoy as a whole
and should not entirely burden a specific
development project.
Highlands Act
In the case of OFP, LLC v. State of
New Jersey, the New Jersey Supreme
Court upheld an Appellate Division
decision that dismissed a challenge
to the Highlands Water Protection
and Planning Act (Highlands Act).
In hearing its first challenge to the
Highlands Act, our Supreme Court
was faced with a challenge that the
Act’s restrictions, as applied to a project
that was fully approved before the
Highlands Act was adopted, was an
unconstitutional taking without just
compensation. The Supreme Court
upheld the Appellate Division ruling
that the plaintiff must first exhaust
all of the available administrative
remedies prior to filing suit alleging a
taking. Property owners in the Highlands
Region can file for a hardship
waiver, which would then be determined
on a case-by-case basis. The
Court found that this provision was
sufficient to render a regulatory taking
claim premature. The Supreme Court
further upheld the Appellate Division
holding that the retroactive application
of the Highlands Act restrictions to
the property in question was valid.
In a challenge brought by the
New Jersey Farm Bureau, the Appellate
Division upheld the validity of a
certain Highland Water Protection
and Planning Act rule but remanded
the matter to NJDEP for an evidentiary
hearing before the Office of
Administrative Law. At issue was
the validity of the septic-density
rule, which prohibits more than one
individual subsurface disposal system
per 88 acres of any lot in the preservation
area that is “forested” or per 25
acres of any lot that is not forested.
Although a challenge to the validity of
an administrative regulation usually is
determined on the record developed
before the agency, a court can remand
to supplement the record and demand
an evidentiary hearing if it finds it
necessary for a proper determination
of the challenge to the regulation. In
In re Highlands Water Protection and
Planning Act Rules N.J.A.C. 7:38-1
et seq., the Appellate Division concluded
that a remand was appropriate
because the Farm Bureau had raised
“substantial questions” regarding the
reasonableness of the methodology on
which NJDEP relied in establishing
the septic-density standards.
Approvals and Variances
In Mountain Hill, LLC v. Zoning
Board of Adjustment of the Township
of Middletown, the Appellate Division
held that cross-zone driveways
merely serve the purpose of reducing
traffic impact on public streets from
movement within the planned unit
development, and that a use variance
is not required for such driveways in
a planned unit development where
the parking in each zone sufficiently
accommodates all of the uses in
that zone and the driveways are not
necessary to access either zone from a
public street.
Unless a county planning board
can establish that the delay was
inadvertent or unintentional, an
applicant is subject to an automatic
approval if the board fails to render
a timely decision on a complete land
use application within the time limits
set forth in N.J.S.A. 40:27-6.7 of the
County Planning Act. This was the
case in Amerada Hess Corp. v. Burlington
County Planning Board, where the
county planning board argued that it
mistakenly believed that it had been
given an extension to review the applicant’s
site plan. The Supreme Court
held that the Legislature enacted this
time limit, which is “of great institutional
value,” to prevent unnecessary
and intentional delay by counties when
reviewing site plan and subdivision
applications. While an automatic
approval should rarely be granted, said
the Court, its issuance is proper when
there is no evidence of mistake, inadvertence,
or other unintentional delay.
In Pond Run Watershed Association
v. Township of Hamilton Zoning
Board of Adjustment, an applicant
proposed in its published and mailed
notice of a use variance, a “mixed-use
active adult community and commercial
development” in an RD zone.
The applicant used the term “commercial
development” to describe a
5,000-square-foot, 168-seat restaurant
with a potential liquor license. The
court invalidated the approvals on the
basis that the notice was inadequate
under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 because
it did not mention the anticipated
restaurant. The Appellate Division
further held that, although the trial
court correctly found that the applicant’s
payment of $476,000 toward an
off-site municipal amphitheater was
an illegal exaction, the matter should
have been remanded to the Zoning
Board instead of merely eliminating
that element of the project.
In a decision approved for publication
on October 6, 2008, the Appellate
Division expanded the application of
the “time of decision rule” to newly
enacted zoning ordinances that are not
yet effective. The court held that the
time-of-decision rule required that the
municipal land use board consider the
applicant’s subdivision application
under the new ordinance and not
under the pre-amendment ordinance,
when the municipal governing body
already had amended its zoning
ordinance but where the amendments
had not yet taken effect. In Maragliano
v. Land Use Board of the Township of
Wantage, a contract purchaser of
property received subdivision approval
three days before the new zoning
ordinance became effective. The
board’s resolution was adopted three
months later. The court found that
the time of decision rule also applies
when a new ordinance is adopted but
not yet effective. The court suggested
that land use boards “not rush to grant
development approvals” where new
ordinances have been adopted and will
soon take effect. The court further
held that the approval did not receive
the two-year statutory protection from
zoning changes because the date runs
from the time that the resolution is
adopted, not from the date of approval.
Developer’s Agreements
In Toll Brothers, Inc. v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of the County of
Burlington, the Supreme Court held
that it is a violation of the Municipal
Land Use Law to require a developer
to contribute more than its pro
rata share of off-site improvements.
Moreover, a developer may modify
or reform any such obligation contained
in a developer’s agreement if
the project and/or obligations have
changed. Toll Brothers acquired land
in foreclosure with municipal and
county approvals and, as a condition
subsequent, entered into developer’s
agreements with the town and county
to memorialize its agreement to complete
off-site roadway improvements.
Toll Brothers substantially decreased
the scope of the development while the
cost of the required off-site improvements
increased nearly $3,000,000.
Toll Brothers was unsuccessful in
renegotiating the agreements with
the township and county and lawsuits
were filed. The Supreme Court held
that, under the MLUL, “a planning
board may only impose off-site
improvements on a developer if they
are necessitated by the development”
and a “developer cannot be compelled
to shoulder more than its pro rata share
of the cost of such improvements.”
Conclusion
During the past year, the courts
have produced a wide variety of
important legal developments. Please
note that the summaries contained
herein can only generally describe the
rulings provided in these cases.
Readers of this article are encouraged
to seek more detailed information
from counsel with regard to these
issues and their impact on any
particular matter. At Hill Wallack
LLP, we look forward to discussing
any of these recent legal developments
with you at your convenience.
Michael J. Lipari is an associate of the firm
and a member of the Land Use Division.
He concentrates his practice in the land
development application and permitting process
and in the litigation of land use matters.
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